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Abstract:  Normative explanations  of  why things are  wrong,  good,  or
unfair  are  ubiquitous  in  ordinary  practice  and  normative  theory.  This
paper  argues  that  normative  explanation  is  subject  to  a  justification
condition: a correct complete explanation of why a normative fact holds
must identify features that would go at least some way towards justifying
certain actions or attitudes. I first explain and motivate the condition I
propose. I then support it by arguing that it fits well with various theories
of normative reasons, makes good sense of certain legitimate moves in
ordinary normative explanatory discourse, and helps to make sense of our
judgments  about  explanatory  priority  in  certain  cases  of  normative
explanation. This last argument also helps to highlight respects in which
normative  explanation  won’t  be  worryingly  discontinuous  with
explanations  in  other  domains  even  though  these  other  explanations
aren’t subject to the justification condition. Thus the paper aims not only
to do some constructive theorizing about the relatively neglected topic of
normative explanation but also to cast light on the broader question of
how  normative  explanation  may  be  similar  to  and  different  from
explanations in other domains. 
1. Introduction
Normative explanations are explanations of why things have the normative features
they do. That a policy is fair because it allows access to higher education to be
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distributed in a manner that is sensitive to brute luck in circumstances of birth and
upbringing is an example of a putative explanation of a particular normative fact.
So is the claim that eating dark chocolate is good in virtue of how it is pleasurable
and healthy.1 Such claims regarding why things are wrong, good, unfair, and the
like, are ubiquitous in ordinary normative discourse and in moral, political,  and
legal theory. The question of what makes for a successful normative explanation is
as  central  to normative inquiry as  the question of  what  makes for a  successful
scientific explanation is to scientific inquiry. But, whereas there is a great deal of
research  on  scientific  explanation, and  an  increasing  amount  of  work  on
metaphysical explanation, little exists on the nature of normative explanation or its
relationship to explanations in other domains. This silence might merely reflect a
reasonable  preference  on  part  of  normative  theorists  to  engage  with  first-order
issues  without  getting  sucked  into  the  metaphysics  of  the  normative.  But  we
shouldn’t assume that this reflects implicit agreement among normative theorists
concerning  the  nature  of  normative  explanation.  It  might  merely  mean  that
normative explanatory talk has been fairly unreflective and unrefined.
This paper argues that normative explanation is subject to a justification
condition: a correct complete answer to the question why a given normative fact
obtains must identify features that would go at least some way towards justifying
certain  responses.  Normative  explanations  are  (perhaps  among  other  things)
justifications: at least some explanatory reasons  why a normative fact holds must
provide normative reasons for certain responses, or be features in the light of which
those  responses  are  apt  or  fitting  or  the  like.  If  that  is  right,  then  the  aim  of
normative theories to explain why the good and the right things are so and their aim
to justify actions and reactions needn’t  be seen as distinct enterprises.  Nor will
there be need to interpret questions such as ‘Why ought I to ___?’ and ‘Why is ___
1 I use ‘explains’ as an inverse of ‘because’ and ‘in virtue of’: A explains B just in case B holds 
because A holds, or in virtue of A holding. I use ‘normative’ as shorthand for ‘normative and 
evaluative’.  
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good?’  as  systematically  ambiguous  between  explanatory  and  justificatory
readings. I’ll also suggest that these local features of normative explanation can be
at least partly accounted for in terms of certain general features of explanation. If
so,  the  justification  condition  needn’t  make  normative  explanation  worryingly
discontinuous with explanations in other domains, and we’ll be able to see how
they  all  might  deserve  the  common  label  ‘explanation’.  Given  the  paucity  of
existing  work  on  normative  explanation,  my  aim  is  less  to  argue  against  any
particular  opponent  than  to  do  some  constructive  theorizing  about  normative
explanation. Those already sympathetic to the kind of claim I’ll defend may take
my discussion as an attempt to spell out such a claim in some detail. (As we’ll see,
the details aren’t straightforward.) Those more dubious about a tight connection
between  normative  explanation  and  justification  will,  I  hope,  find  reason  to
reconsider.
2. The Justification Condition on Normative Explanation
The  question  how  normative  explanation  and  justification  are  related  is  rarely
raised. This is curious. Questions of why certain things are good and bad, or what
we ought  to  do,  can be  interpreted as  asking for  explanations  or  as  asking for
justifications.  It  seems  crucially  important  to  determine  when  such  questions
request  one  or  the  other  or  both.  When  the  relationship  does  get  addressed,
normative explanation and justification are sometimes identified.2 This is far from
obviously right, however. For instance, they have different relata: what is explained
are normative and evaluative facts, whereas normative justification may take as its
objects actions, attitudes, policies, norms, rules, and so on. Insofar as there is an
2 Wedgwood writes that “explanatory characterizations” of normative reasons  “associate reasons 
with a justificatory story—that is, with a story that explains the truth about which action or attitude 
one has, all things considered, most reason to do” (Wedgwood 2017: 91). Hyman explores ways in 
which explanation and justification are closely related, and argues that justification is a particular 
kind of explanation, namely of why something is just or right (Hyman 2015: ch. 6). Elstein suggests
that normative explanation “coincides” with justification (Elstein ms).
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interesting connection between things that figure in normative explanations and
things that figure in normative justifications, it isn’t immediately clear what that
connection is or whether such a connection holds uniformly when the facts being
explained are evaluative facts, such as facts about what is good, and when they are
normative facts, such as facts about what we ought to do.
It is plausible that there is some interesting and close connection between
normative explanation and justification. Particular normative and evaluative facts
aren’t brute. If an agent ought to φ, there must be some fact or facts that explain
why she ought to φ. Similarly, if  x is good, there must be some fact or facts that
explain why it is good. But normative and evaluative facts about what we ought to
do and what is good also imply that certain responses are appropriate, apt, fitting,
merited, called for, or warranted—in short, justified.3 What I take to be attractive is
that at least one fact among those that explain why I ought to keep my talk to its
allotted time should provide normative reason to do as I ought, or make it fitting to
intend to do so, or make it appropriate to disapprove of me if I go on for longer, or
the like—at least in some respect or to some extent.4 If no such responses were
justified in any respect or extent, why ought I to keep my talk to time?5 Similarly,
at least one fact among those that explain why helping a homeless shelter is good
(whether pro tanto good, morally good, good simpliciter, or what not) should go at
least  some  way  towards  justifying  some  such  responses  as  promoting,
3 It is no accident that normative reasons are also called “justifying reasons” (e.g. Darwall 1983).
4 One might worry that the idea articulated here is too close to obvious or trivial. For whatever one 
thinks about the connection between explanations of evaluative facts and normative justification, 
one might find it hard to see how there could, even in principle, fail to be a connection between an 
explanation of why I ought to φ and a justification for φ-ing. The discussion that follows will 
indicate respects in which substantial assumptions are required for connecting even explanations of 
why one ought to φ to the justification for φ-ing. 
5 If there are many different oughts (moral, prudential, legal, etc.), then something that I ought to do
in one respect (e.g. prudentially) might, of course, not be justified in another (e.g. morally). My 
points here don’t require that whenever some agent ought to φ, there is some fact or facts that count 
in favor of φ-ing. (Some “oughts of rational requirement” might not require this, for instance.)
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commending, or cherishing help to the shelter. If some such responses weren’t apt
or fitting in the light of the reasons why helping the shelter is good, why count
helping it as good in the first place? So there is at least some initial motivation for a
justification  condition  on  normative  explanation.  I’ll  first  articulate  some
assumptions  implicit  in these motivations,  and then formulate the condition I’ll
defend.
The above examples suggest that there is a close connection between the
obtaining of a normative fact and certain actions’ or reactions’ being justified (apt,
fitting, or the like) in response to the state of affairs (or its constituent object) in
question.  Normative  facts  embed  or  imply  ideals  or  standards  for  actions  or
attitudes. Adapting a fairly common way of understanding normative standards, a
normative fact  specifies (implicitly or explicitly) a condition that is to be met by
someone or something (perhaps under certain other conditions), and against which
it  is at  least in principle possible to appraise the thing in question positively or
negatively on the basis of whether it meets the condition in question.6 In this way,
normative facts play a role in directing or regulating our actions and attitudes. It
seems  hard  to  avoid  characterizing  normative  facts  without  reference  to  what
responses are apt under what conditions.7 Take, for instance, the relation between
pleasure and goodness. That an experience is pleasant doesn’t ipso facto mean that
certain  responses  are  apt  or  fitting,  or  that  anyone  has  reason  to  react  in  any
particular way. But the fact that the experience is good does ipso facto mean this.
The contrast remains at least so as long as pleasure and goodness are conceptually
(even if not metaphysically) distinct aspects of situations. That an experience is
6 See e.g. Copp (1995: 19). While standards are typically taken to be general, my formulation in the 
text is meant to leave room also for particularist views that don’t countenance general normative 
principles.
7 If someone thinks that facts about what one ought to do or about what is good are no more tightly 
linked to the appropriateness of certain responses than facts about what is pleasant, I would have to 
hear their characterization of normative facts to assess to what extent the rest of my discussion 
might still apply.
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pleasant  isn’t itself a normative fact, but a normatively significant non-normative
fact, one that contributes to the obtaining of a normative fact. Normative properties
can be distinguished from normatively significant non-normative properties in part
by how they relate to certain responses.
The justification condition on normative explanation which I propose takes
this connection between normative facts and their consequences for what responses
are justified to be tight enough for the latter to be included as part of what gets
explained in normative explanation.8 This should seem plausible to those (many)
who think that a distinctive feature of normative concepts is that their satisfaction
ipso facto means that someone or other has reason to respond in certain ways or
that certain responses would be fitting or appropriate.9 (The idea should suit also
expressivists  and  others  who  have  no  truck  with  normative  facts  in  any
metaphysically robust sense.) It should also seem plausible to those who think the
same about normative properties. On either view, it is plausible that an explanation
of why  x is F isn’t an explanation of why  x is  good unless the explanation goes
some way towards justifying responses like promoting, cherishing, or protecting. It
is similarly plausible that an explanation of why x is F isn’t an explanation of why
x is right unless it goes some way towards justifying responses like performing x,
resenting those who don’t do x, or the like.
This idea can be turned into a general justification condition as follows:
(NEJ) For any particular normative fact N, a correct complete normative
explanation of why N obtains must identify features that would go at
8 Thanks to Geoff Sayre-McCord for a helpful discussion here.
9 This allows but doesn’t require that the fact that something is good or the fact that something is 
right is itself a reason. (See section 4.) Nor does it require a reasons-first or fittingness-first 
approach to normativity.
6
least  some  way  towards  justifying  certain  responses  to  (the
constituent object of) N.10
Here ‘N’ holds the place for a that-clause that expresses a fact.11 Instantiated for
one  of  my  examples  above,  (NEJ)  says  that  a  correct  complete  normative
explanation of why helping a homeless shelter is good (why that normative fact
obtains) must identify features that would go at least some way towards justifying
certain responses either to the fact that helping the shelter is good or to the relevant
constituent, helping the shelter.12 The substantial claim of (NEJ) is that the truth of
normative explanations of the form ‘N because ___’ requires that the features that
replace the blank include features in the light of which it would be apt or fitting to
act or react in a certain way or which would provide reasons to do so. The ‘would’
is meant to avoid problems such as “solitary goods”: good states of affairs that
entail that there are no past, present, or future subjects to adopt the fitting responses
(Bykvist  2009).  A putative  normative  explanation  that  fails  (NEJ)  is  a  failed
normative explanation: false, incorrect, or no explanation at all, depending on our
ideology of explanation. If we think of an explanation of why N obtains as the
content of an answer to the question ‘Why N?’, then (NEJ) is equally a constraint
on correct complete answers to the questions of why particular normative facts
obtain.13 I restrict (NEJ) to particular normative facts because singular explanation
10 (NEJ) is an attempt to spell out a very quick suggestion in Väyrynen (2013: 173), inspired by 
conversations in the distant past with Christian Coons and Daniel Elstein. Thanks also to Walter 
Pedriali for helpful suggestions about formulating (NEJ).  
11 Sometimes I’ll take the liberty of putting in for ‘N’ a term that denotes a fact. Nothing deep hangs
on this.
12 Whether the proper object of a response is a fact or its constituent object may vary across 
different responses.
13 For reasons to focus on answers to why-questions in theorizing about explanation, see e.g. Skow 
(2016: ch. 2). 
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may differ in important ways from explanations of laws. (The two are commonly
kept separate in discussions of scientific explanation.)  
(NEJ)  makes  a  general  claim  about  normative  explanation.  It  doesn’t
threaten to overgeneralize to explanations of non-normative facts. We don’t expect
an explanation of why H2O boils at  100°C at sea level to identify features that
would (in the relevant sense) justify any particular response to that fact, and the
same goes for the non-normative fact that an experience is pleasant. But within the
normative domain I have so far tried to make (NEJ) plausible only in the special
cases  of  facts  about  what  we  ought  to  do  and  facts  about  what  is  good.
Generalizing  from  these  cases  to  (NEJ)  in  full  generality  raises  various
complications.
First, to just what range of facts (NEJ) applies will depend on what facts
count as normative. Views vary, for instance, on whether the disjunctive fact that
stealing is wrong or grass is green, or the negative fact that there is no reason not to
do something, are normative facts. I cannot settle these matters here, so my defense
of  (NEJ)  will  remain  hostage  to  how  the  contours  of  the  normative  and  the
evaluative  end up being drawn.  Here  I  aim to  defend (NEJ)  with  respect  to  a
paradigmatic range of particular normative facts.
Second, it is unclear what responses are apt to such normative facts as that
one  has  normative  reason  to  do  something,  or  that  something  is  (merely)
permissible, or that something is a good instance of a kind, or that something is
supererogatory? A systematic pairing of normative properties and apt responses to
them is again beyond the scope of one paper. But I remain optimistic. It doesn’t
seem implausible that if the Wegner Wishbone is a good dining chair, it is fitting to
commend it for use as a dining chair, or at least that if there is reason to commend
things for use as dining chairs, there is reason to commend the Wegner Wishbone.
Nor  is  it  implausible  that  if  spending  a  Sunday  reading  fiction  is  merely
permissible, it is appropriate to tolerate that activity. And if I have a reason to go
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and see a friend’s band, it seems fitting to recommend doing so, at least provided
that there is no decisive reason to do something else. Beyond this, we recognize
plenty of room for substantial debate about which sorts of actions or reactions, of
which  subjects,  under  what  conditions,  are  justified  responses  to  instances  of
different  normative  properties.  Whatever  else  these  complications  may  end  up
showing, they should at least ensure that (NEJ) isn’t trivial.
Nothing in our thinking about explanation in general rules out (NEJ). Why-
questions ask for reasons, and reasons are what figure in the  contents of correct
answers to why-questions. When R is the content of a correct answer to ‘Why Q?’,
R is at least part of a complete explanation of why Q. (Read ‘Q because R’ and ‘R
is a reason why Q’ accordingly.14) We already recognize that in different contexts,
why-questions ask for different sorts of reasons: sometimes for a cause, sometimes
a ground, sometimes a motive or purpose. There is then no principled reason why
normative why-questions couldn’t ask for reasons that justify. A question like ‘Why
should I pay my taxes?’—let alone the ‘Why be moral?’ question—is naturally
heard as asking for a justification for a requirement on action. (NEJ) makes this
compatible with the truism that why-questions ask for reasons without implying
that normative why-questions are systematically ambiguous between requests for
explanation and requests for justification.
(NEJ) concerns complete explanations of normative facts. But my examples
of normative explanations have featured partial rather than complete explanations.
For instance, that E is an experience of pleasure is presumably not the full story
about why E is good. It is a matter of controversy in the theory of explanation what
a  complete  explanation  of  a  phenomenon  consists  in.  (It  is  also  a  matter  of
14 ‘R [partly] explains why Q’ is factive with respect to ‘Q’. But it is controversial whether ‘R is a 
reason why Q’ is also factive with respect to Q. There can be reasons why I ought to do something 
even though it isn’t the case that I ought to do it (Nebel forthcoming). I’ll focus on cases where the 
fact that’s being explained obtains. So I won’t need to worry about factivity failures when I use the 
term ‘reason why’.
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controversy what a complete answer to a why-question consists in.) One issue is
what factors are required to be in place for R to be a complete explanation of Q.
Another question is which of these factors are parts of such an explanation, and
which (if any) play some other role with respect to the complete explanation. For
instance,  it  is  controversial  whether complete explanation in some way requires
general laws or principles. Moreover, even if it does, it is controversial whether
laws  are  parts  of  complete  explanations  or  only  “back”  them.15 It  is  also
controversial how facts that “enable” others to make something the case relate to a
complete explanation of it.16 Are they parts of such explanations, or do they explain
why some other facts are parts of such explanations, or do they play some other
role altogether? Fortunately I needn’t take a stand on these questions here, and can
continue to work with partial  explanations.  For it  would be odd if,  for a given
normative fact N, no partial explanation of N had to identify features that would go
at least some way towards justifying certain responses to it. Again, if none of the
reasons  why  something  is  good  could  go  any  way  towards  justifying  certain
positive responses to it, why think it is good in the first place? But if at least one
partial explanation of why it is good must identify such features, then a complete
explanation must do so—as (NEJ) says.
The notion of explanation which I take to be relevant to (NEJ) is objective
in three senses. First,  I’ll  take the fundamental relata of explanation to be facts
rather than representations.17 Those allergic to talk of normative facts are welcome
15 For an overview of this kind of debate, see Hillel-Ruben (2012: ch. 6).
16 On enablers, see Dancy (2004: ch. 3). For a brief discussion of what role enablers might play in 
normative explanation, see Väyrynen (forthcoming). We’ll also need to settle what role factors that 
“intensify” reasons to φ without themselves being reasons to φ play in normative explanations of 
why there is more reason to φ than to ψ.
17 I take facts to be structured non-representational entities composed of worldly item such as 
objects, properties or relations, and the like, and individuated by their constituents and their mode of
composition. However, if desired, I could accommodate the view that facts are true propositions. 
Nothing too deep hangs on the first assumption. 
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to give a deflationary interpretation of such talk or replace it with their preferred
substitute. Second, normative explanation is objective in that its correctness isn’t
relative to the interests or background knowledge of an audience, at least not once
context has done what it may do to influence which why-question an interrogative
sentence of the form ‘Why Q?’ is  being used to  ask in the context  in  the first
place.18 First-order normative theories aim to supply explanations that are objective
in this  sense.  For  instance,  if  some form of act-consequentialism is  the correct
moral theory, then wrong actions are wrong in virtue of failing to maximize the
value of outcomes, irrespective of how that relates to our interests or knowledge.19
Third,  normative explanation is  objective in  that it  isn’t  a constraint on correct
normative  explanation  that  it  induce  understanding  in  a  given  audience.
Explanations often are in a good position to do so. But if act-consequentialism is
the  correct  moral  theory,  then  wrong  actions  are  wrong in  virtue  of  failing  to
maximize value, irrespective of whether this explanation induces understanding of
why the wrong actions are wrong in the given audience.
These assumptions  concern correct  normative explanations.  Among such
explanations, some may be better or worse relative to an audience, depending on
how well they fit with the audience’s interests and background knowledge or how
liable they are to induce understanding. If an audience isn’t asking a moral question
18 It is widely recognized that one and the same interrogative sentence can be used to ask different 
why-questions in different contexts of utterance (see e.g. van Fraassen 1980: ch. 5). There is less 
consensus on what makes why-interrogatives context-sensitive in this way (cf. Skow 2016: 62–4). A
fuller theory of normative explanation than I can offer here would say more about how such 
context-sensitivity relates to normative explanation. (NEJ) may imply that normative contexts 
restrict the domain of possible complete answers to ‘Why Q?’ so that it must include facts that are 
capable of justifying the relevant responses. I would see this as a feature, not a bug. Also note that 
an explanation that is objective in the sense I specify can be subject to certain further kinds of 
epistemic constraints, such as, perhaps, contributing to the contextually salient explanatory project. I
won’t rely on this, but can allow it.
19 The question whether normative explanation is objective in this sense shouldn’t be confused with 
the question whether the normative facts that are being explained themselves reflect epistemic or 
pragmatic factors. For instance, if moral obligation is evidence-relative or facts about what is right 
concern what maximizes expected value, their explanation can still be objective in the sense I 
specify.
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when they ask ‘Why is killing bad?’, the answer that killing is bad because it fails
to maximize value might be a poor answer in that conversational context. But that
would make it no less true as an answer to the moral question which this why-
interrogative can be used to ask. Distinguishing the notion of a correct explanation
from that of a better/worse explanation allows an objective notion of normative
explanation to accommodate the idea that normative theories aim also to provide
useful practical guidance. Perhaps meeting the epistemic and pragmatic conditions
required  for  useful  practical  guidance  makes  a  normative  explanation  a  better
explanation. It doesn’t follow that meeting them is a correctness condition on the
explanation. Nor does it follow that justifying actions or reactions requires meeting
the sorts of epistemic or pragmatic conditions which would make explanation non-
objective.  A justification,  too,  may  be  correct  or  sound  without  always  being
available for useful guidance.
I’ll leave (NEJ) intentionally generic in further respects of interpretation. It
sets out a schematic condition that can be filled out in different ways. For instance,
I’m happy to allow various views regarding which objective relation of the general
type I have specified is at work in normative explanation. Irrespective of whether
‘in  virtue  of’  and  ‘because’  stand  for  grounding,  constitution,  counterfactual
invariance, or something else, (NEJ) merely requires instances of these relations (or
the explanations they back) to have a certain justificatory feature when the facts to
be  explained are  normative  facts.  So far  as  (NEJ)  goes,  normative  explanation
needn’t be distinctive regarding what kind of explanation it is, but only regarding
what  it  is  an  explanation  of—namely,  facts  that  ipso  facto mean  that  certain
responses are apt or fitting, or that someone or other has reason to act or react in
some way.
That (NEJ) remains schematic in some respects doesn’t mean that we lack
independent grip on what it amounts to. Consider some intuitive characterizations
of  normative  justification.  Normative  justification  for  φ-ing  is  sometimes
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understood in terms of a  contribution to  closing deliberative questions,  such as
whether to φ. In that case, (NEJ) requires a correct complete normative explanation
to identify features that would contribute to closing such questions.20 This seems
plausible. Suppose that an experience E is good because it is pleasant. That E is
pleasant contributes to closing such questions as whether to pursue or commend E.
Of course, that E is pleasant might not do so if there were no bridge assumption to
the effect that pleasure (of at least certain kinds) is good. But in that case the fact
that E is pleasant might not partly explain why E is good in the first place. The fact
that a glass has a molecular composition M goes no way towards explaining why
the  glass  is  fragile  in  the  absence  of  a  bridge  law  connecting  fragility  to  its
categorical base.21 Given such a law, having M partly explains why the glass is
fragile.  (NEJ)  makes  good  sense  under  this  kind  of  way  of  thinking  about
normative justification.
A  different  way  to  understand  normative  justification  is  that  justified
responses, requirements, or norms are authoritative regarding how to act and react,
not arbitrary. (NEJ) would then require a correct complete normative explanation to
identify features that would go at least some way towards making directives for
certain responses relevantly authoritative. This may amount to different things in
different cases. The phenomenology of normative authority normally presents such
authority as external to one’s will, sentiments, and desires. For instance, suppose it
is good to minimize our consumption of plastic and a certain policy would reduce
our consumption significantly. That a policy would do so would be authoritative
with respect  to  what  policy to  promote or  commend in a way that  stems from
outside of our will or desires. 
20 Different views are, of course, available regarding what it takes to close a normative question. 
For one particularly demanding proposal, see Korsgaard (1996).
21 This is of course a controversial view on the metaphysics of dispositions. But I hope it’ll do for 
illustration.
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Not all cases are like this, even if the phenomenology suggests otherwise.22
That a standard of etiquette has currency in a community is external to one’s will
and  desires.  But  the  normative  authority  of  such a  standard  is  widely  seen  as
hypothetical  on  one’s  ends.  Instrumental  and  prudential  normativity  are  also
relevantly authoritative. If something is in my best interest, a directive to pursue it
is authoritative in a way that directives to pursue things that aren’t in my interest
aren’t,  irrespective of whether the normative authority of self-interest  resides in
one’s will or desires. For the instrumental case, suppose that I have some suitably
significant desire that φ and that ψ-ing is a necessary means to φ, so that I have a
reason to ψ. Here (NEJ) would require a correct complete explanation of why I
have reason to ψ to identify features that  would go at  least  some way towards
making a directive to ψ relevantly authoritative for me. What features those would
be depends on what the best theory of instrumental reasons is. For instance, they
might be facts that explain why ψ-ing is a necessary means to φ. In that case (NEJ)
makes good sense. If φ is a suitably significant end of mine and R explains why ψ-
ing is a necessary means to φ, then R meets the condition imposed by (NEJ). For
instance, R would explain why not ψ-ing would open me to criticism in the light of
my own ends, and to that extent would make a directive to ψ authoritative for me.
The cases of etiquette and instrumental reason also show that (NEJ) is neutral on
whether normative justification is sometimes categorical or always hypothetical.
(NEJ) takes no stand on whether a correct normative explanation of why φ-ing
would be morally wrong must identify features that provide categorical reasons for
action. 
22 Star writes that “the problem of authority is the problem of the possible justification of one being 
subject to directives originating outside of oneself” (Star 2015: 42). I suggest this isn’t quite right. 
Etiquette directives originate outside of me, and other people may issue me with directives based on
facts about what is instrumental to my ends. It doesn’t follow that the normative authority of such 
directives is external to my will or desires.
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3. (NEJ) and Theories of Reasons
In articulating (NEJ) I have already suggested that it is attractive in certain central
cases and fits with a common conception of what is distinctive about normative
concepts or properties. In the next three sections I’ll offer further support for (NEJ).
The first piece of support is that (NEJ) falls out of many prominent theories of
normative reasons.
One example are theories according to which normative reasons for actions
or attitudes are facts that make certain normative facts hold.23 One such view is that
reasons why an agent ought to φ are normative reasons for her to φ.24 Broome, for
instance, holds that a reason for S to φ is a fact that plays the ‘pro φ-ing’ role in a
weighing explanation of how S ought to  act  (Broome 2013).  We don’t  need to
accept this as an analysis of normative reasons to agree that facts that explain why
you ought to do a thing are reasons for you to do it. Suppose we do agree with that.
A normative reason for something just is a consideration that justifies it, at least to
some extent or in some respect. Thus, accounts of normative reasons like this imply
that facts that explain why you ought to φ go at least some way towards justifying
φ-ing. This also extends beyond ‘ought’. A reason why a thing is good is something
in the light of which it would be fitting to act or react in certain ways, and thus
justifies those responses at least in some respect.25
(NEJ) also falls  out  of  views according to which normative reasons are
evidence of a certain type (Kearns and Star 2009; Whiting 2018). If a fact is a
reason why you ought to φ, it  is evidence that there is at least some respect in
which you ought to φ. (The converse fails. A fact can be evidence that P without
23 This claim is non-trivial. Favoring an act (which is what normative reasons do) and making an act
right (which is what a reason why an act is right does) are distinct relations (Dancy 2004: 79–80).
24 See e.g. Alvarez (2010), Broome (2013), and Nebel (forthcoming). Hyman says that a reason to 
act is an explanation of why it is right to act, but uses a non-objective notion of explanation (2015: 
136). 
25 Raz (1999) analyzes reasons for action as explanations of why it is good that a person acts.
15
being a reason why P.) If normative reasons are evidence, then such a fact is a
reason for  you to φ.   But  again,  normative reasons to φ go at  least  some way
towards justifying φ-ing. So a fact partly explains why an agent ought to φ only if it
goes at least some way towards justifying her φ-ing.
Even  views  on which  normative  reasons  are  facts  that  would  explain  a
possible response on the part of some relevant agent which would count as an ideal
response may at least fit with (NEJ). For instance, if x’s being F explains why x is
good, and something like promotion, admiration, or approval is an ideal response to
Fs, then ‘x is good because it is F’ could be said to identify features that would go
at least some way towards justifying certain responses to x.26
In sum, there are several theories of normative reasons which fit well with
(NEJ). This gives us reason to accept (NEJ) insofar as these theories of reasons are
credible.
4. (NEJ) and Normative Discourse
My second piece of support for (NEJ) comes from certain features of our ordinary
normative discourse. Bits of ordinary discourse are of course subject to pragmatic
influences. But this doesn’t mean that they cannot provide evidence that normative
explanation (in the kind of objective sense I specified) works as (NEJ) suggests.
Consider a Socratic sort of person, one whose life is characterized by a certain sort
of  intellectual  activity.27 Suppose  hers  is  a  good  life.  Suppose  it  is  a  life  of
accomplishment. Suppose it is a life that displays understanding. And suppose that
in her life she does things like writing the particular words with their particular
meanings (with an understanding of their meanings) which she writes in her papers,
26 It is less clear whether (NEJ) fits in the same way with certain other views, such as that normative
reasons are premises of good reasoning.
27 I adapt the example from a discussion of moral supervenience in Smith (2000). It may be a 
simplistic example, but its simplicity is useful for my purpose of illustrating a certain kind of 
structure.
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giving talks, teaching an mentoring, and so on. (I’ll abbreviate these as ‘writes the
stuff she writes’.)
Why is the Socratic sort’s life a good life? Here are some possible answers
to this question, construed as requesting a normative explanation:
(1) The Socratic sort’s life is good because it is a life of accomplishment.
(2) The Socratic sort’s life is good because it displays understanding.
(3) The Socratic sort’s life is good because she writes the stuff she writes
(etc.).
(4) Each of (1)-(3).
(5) Not each of (1)-(3) but more than one of them.
For the present purposes,  I needn’t  deny either (4) or (5). Perhaps the Socratic
sort’s  life  is  one  of  accomplishment  at  least  in  part  because  it  displays
understanding and displays understanding at least in part because she writes the
stuff she writes. If the facts in the right-hand sides of (1)-(3) form this kind of
metaphysical hierachy, neither (4) nor (5) should entail any objectionable kind of
overdetermination  of  the  fact  that  the  Socratic  sort’s  life  is  a  good  life.  Also
assume, for simplicity, that the explanatory facts identified in (1)-(3) exhaust the
options,  however each would have to be supplemented to constitute a complete
explanation. If you already accept (NEJ), I can also grant that each of, or more than
one of, (1)-(3) identify features that would go at least some way towards justifying
certain responses. In what follows I address those who don’t already accept (NEJ).
I’ll  argue that certain legitimate responses to (1)-(3) as putative explanations of
why the Socratic sort’s life is good point to reasons to accept (NEJ).
Consider (3) as an answer to the question why the Socratic sort’s life is
good. One legitimate response to this answer would be to ask: what difference does
the fact that she writes the stuff she writes make to her life’s being good? One
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answer that would be to the point of this query is that the stuff she writes displays
understanding. After all, had it not displayed understanding, it wouldn’t have been
part of what makes her life good. Either her life wouldn’t have been good, or it
would have to have been good in some different way.28 If this query is a legitimate
response to (3), what does that tell us?
The query isn’t a merely epistemic query arising from lack of knowledge
regarding the metaphysically lower-level facts reported in (3) or their relation to the
higher-level facts reported in (2). Epistemic gaps might suffice to account for other
cases, but that needn’t be so here. I’ve read enough of Hume’s Treatise and Kant’s
Critiques to grasp that they display great understanding. If I can, so can you. More
plausibly,  the  query  about  (3)  suggests  that  certain  facts  qualify  as  explaining
normative facts only insofar as they are suitably related to certain other facts that
explain normative facts. For it suggests that the fact that the Socratic sort writes the
stuff she writes plays a distinctive role in making her life good only insofar as the
stuff displays understanding. Since (2) is itself a putative explanation of why her
life is good, the idea isn’t merely that the fact that her life displays understanding
enables the fact that she writes the stuff she writes to explain why her life is good.
Nor are (2) and (3) distinct parts of the same complete explanation; they operate at
different levels. What I suggest our responses to indicate instead is that (2) is a
more basic explanation than (3) in the order of normative explanation, even if (3)
may be more basic than (2) in the order of metaphysical fundamentality.
This claim about how (2) and (3) are related involves particular first-order
normative assumptions.  It  assumes that a principle  linking understanding to the
relevant  kind of goodness is  normatively more basic  than a principle  that  links
writing the stuff  the Socratic sort  writes to the relevant kind of goodness. This
strikes me as a plausible first-order assumoption. But the essential point for my
purposes  is  a  structural  point  which  is  independent  of  particular  first-order
28 For purposes of illustration, I’ll bracket cases where the stuff the Socratic sort does exemplifies 
some other good-making feature than displaying understanding.
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normative  assumptions.  We—or,  at  any  rate,  I—don’t  yet  have  well-developed
conceptual resources for fully explicating this structural point. But let me try to
bring out the general idea.
(3) says that the fact that the Socratic sort writes the stuff she writes is a
reason why her life is good. It is legitimate to ask why that is so. The answer will
be a higher-level reason why: a fact (or a set of facts) that is a reason why <the fact
that the Socratic sort writes the stuff she writes is a reason why her life is good>.29
Those facts might not be still more metaphysically fundamental than the fact that
the Socratic sort writes the stuff she writes. The answer will consist either in facts
that  are  more  basic  in  normative  significance  (irrespective  of  their  relative
metaphysical fundamentality) or, if we have already hit the bedrock of normative
significance,  in  something  like  a  general  principle  encoding  the  normative
significance of the fact in question, or perhaps in some transcendental condition.30
Our query about (3) suggests that we don’t take the normative significance of the
fact that the Socratic sort writes the stuff she writes to be bedrock. Rather we think
its normative significance is based on its standing in some suitable (such as causal
or constitutive) asymmetric relation to something else of normative significance.
For my point, it doesn’t matter whether this “something else” is the fact that
the  Socratic  sort’s  life  displays  understanding  or  that  her  life  is  one  of
accomplishment, or some still other fact. The general form of my suggestion above
is that <the fact that the Socratic sort writes the stuff she writes is a reason why her
life is good> obtains because [the stuff that the Socratic sort writes is F and <the
fact that her life is F is a reason why her life is good>]. What goes in for ‘F’ will
29 I use corner brackets to keep iterations of reasons why readable. Skow (2016: ch. 5) offers a 
general discussion of higher-level reasons why. Väyrynen (forthcoming) discusses its application to 
the normative case. 
30 By a normatively significant fact/property I mean a fact/property that contributes to the 
instantiation of a normative property. Being right (good, etc.) making and being wrong (bad, etc.) 
making are two paradigm cases of such normative significance.
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depend on the correct first-order normative theory. It could be that the normative
significance of accomplishment is more basic than the normative significance of
understanding.31 Or it could be the other way around. And given what I said about
(4) and (5) above, there may not always be a unique normatively the most basic
node in a chain of metaphysical determination. The way these normative chips in
fact fall would be reflected in how the correct first-order normative theory relates
the principles which link understanding and accomplishment, respectively, to the
relevant kind of goodness.
Suppose the above is  broadly on the right  track.  How is  it  supposed to
support (NEJ)? Recall the query about (3): what difference does it make to whether
the Socratic sort’s life is good that she writes the stuff she writes? If explaining
why the Socratic sort’s life is good only required identifying some or other facts
that make her life is good, this query shouldn’t arise. So the query seems to be
asking for something more than just any metaphysical ground of the fact that her
life is good. (NEJ) identifies a plausible candidate for this “something more”. The
fact that the Socratic sort writes the stuff she writes doesn’t seem by itself to justify
such responses as commending or cherishing the Socratic sort’s life. This is why it
seemed plausible that an answer that would be to the point of the query about (3)
would be something like: the fact that the Socratic sort writes the stuff she writes
matters to her life’s being good insofar as her life displays understanding. (NEJ)
can explain why this would be to the point by saying that (2) identifies features that
go at least some way towards justifying the relevant responses.32 Or, given different
31 A legitimate response to (2) as an answer to the question why the Socratic sort’s life is good 
would be to ask: what difference does the fact that her life displays understanding make to her life’s 
being good? If our response is that displaying understanding is an important kind of 
accomplishment, this suggests that we regard the normative significance of understanding as less 
basic than the normative significance of accomplishment. If our response is merely something like 
‘Understanding is a really good thing’, this suggests we don’t take such a view.
32 In view of what I said above about first-order normative assumptions, a more precise claim 
would be that (2) identifies features that at least do better in justifying the relevant responses.
20
first-order assumptions, that role might be played by (1) instead. (What normative
justifications hold depends on what normative principles hold just as much as what
normative explanations hold so depends.) But, either way, the fact that (NEJ) can
make sense of legitimate reactions to putative normative explanations of why the
Socratic sort’s life is good is evidence that at least one of (1)-(3) must identify
features  that  justify  certain  responses.  We aren’t  satisfied that  (3)  does  so,  and
move on to consider whether (2) does. But if at least one of (1)-(3) must identify
features that would go at least some way towards justifying certain responses, then
a complete correct explanation of why the Socratic sort’s life is good must do so.  
This argument for (NEJ) claims that (3) doesn’t  by itself identify features
that would justify the responses that are apt to the fact that the Socratic sort’s life is
good. This move can be spelled out in two different ways, depending on our other
commitments.33 One  is  that  (3)  identifies  no normative  reason  to  commend  or
cherish her  kind  of  life,  or  no feature  that  would  make these  responses  apt  or
fitting. The other is that (3) does identify a justification, but one that is in some
sense  derivative. On this view, the fact that the Socratic sort writes the stuff she
writes is a reason to commend or cherish her life, or would make these responses
apt or fitting, but it has such a normative status only insofar as, and because, it is
suitably related to some distinct fact that has such a normative status (perhaps, that
her life displays understanding).34 
33 Many further issues about normative reasons arise in this neighborhood which I cannot address in
this paper. For one interesting recent discussion of some of the issues I have in mind, see Johnson 
King (2019). 
34 There are many possible ways for a reason to be derivative, besides the kind of constitutive 
structure that we find in the Socratic sort example, depending on what count as relevantly “suitable”
relations. If I have a reason to hydrate myself, then my reason to drink water is, plausibly, a 
derivative reason thanks to a certain causal relation. If the fact that x is right is any reason to do x in 
the first place, it looks like a derivative reason to do x thanks to its relation to reasons to do x which 
are overall stronger than reasons not to do x. And if teachers have reason to set work that is 
appropriate to their students’ level of capacity, then first-grade teachers’ reason to set work that 
develops basic literacy and numeracy skills is, plausibly, a derivative reason thanks to a certain kind
of specification relation. (Some of these more basic reasons may themselves derive from some still 
further reasons.) On the face of it, these examples don’t require there to be a unique fact from which
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I  won’t  try  to  decide  between  these  options,  not  least  because  I  doubt
intuitions about reasons will help much. So far as (NEJ) goes, the choice between
the options depends,  among other  things,  on whether  to  countenance derivative
explanations. To illustrate the structure of a derivative explanation, we might say
that the Socratic sort’s life is good because she writes the stuff she writes, where
this  explanation  holds  insofar  as,  and  because,  the  stuff  she  writes  displays
understanding and her life is good because it displays understanding. Derivative
explanations  are  ruled  neither  in  nor  out  by  (NEJ)  as  such.  The  issue  matters
because countenancing derivative explanations would require one of two things:
either  restricting  (NEJ)  only  to  non-derivative  explanation  and  justification,  or
distinguishing that reading of (NEJ) from one that connects derivative justification
to  derivative  explanation.35 Either  way,  if  (3)  identifies  derivative  reasons  to
commend or cherish the Socratic sort’s life, (3) wouldn’t satisfy the non-derivative
reading of (3) but would plausibly satisfy the derivative reading of (NEJ) if we
countenanced such a  thing.  So (NEJ)  doesn’t  require  us to  distinguish between
derivative  and  non-derivative  explanations  or  justifications,  but  it  can
accommodate such distinctions.
One might think it isn’t plausible that there is any non-arbitrary way to treat
(2) but not (3) as identifying facts that would justify certain responses when the
facts they feature are metaphysically related in the way they are in the Socratic sort
case. This worry is resistible once we clarify what (NEJ) does and doesn’t entail.
(NEJ) doesn’t  require (2) to constitute a unique correct explanation of why the
Socratic sort’s life is good. I granted that (3) can be true, and that (1) can be true.
My  argument  only  requires  that  a  complete  correct  explanation  must  identify
a derivative reason derives its reasonhood. Nor do I take them to suggest that to classify a reason as 
derivative is to dismiss it, for instance as “not real” or as incapable of fulfilling certain job 
descriptions of normative reasons for action.
35 I assume that (NEJ) should in this case feature parallel qualifications on its left-hand and right-
hand sides.
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features that would go at least some way towards justifying certain responses, and
that not all features that may figure in a correct complete normative explanation are
bound to satisfy this requirement. It doesn’t entail that explanations that don’t by
themselves satisfy this requirement are false, so long as some other explanation of
the same normative fact does satisfy it.  I also noted that first-order assumptions
about  which  normative  principles  are  more  basic  than  others  matters  to  which
explanations  satisfy  (NEJ).  It  doesn’t  seem arbitrary  which  principle  identifies
features whose normative significance is more fundamental: one connecting facts
about  the  stuff  that  the  Socratic  sort  writes  to  goodness  or  one  connecting
understanding to goodness. 
5. (NEJ) and the Euthyphro Dilemma
My  third  argument  for  (NEJ)  concerns  our  judgments  about  the  direction  of
normative  explanation  in  Euthyphro-style  cases.  In  Plato’s  dialogue  Euthyphro,
Socrates raises the question whether pious thing are pious because gods love them
or whether gods love them because they are pious.36 The question is widely thought
to generate a dilemma against those who endorse the former answer. If gods love
the pious, either they do so for reasons independent of their love or not. If they
have no independent reason to love the pious, then their love seems arbitrary and
it’s unclear why their love should be normative or authoritative for us. But if gods
love the pious for an independent reason, then what really explains why the pious
things are pious are the reasons that explain why gods love them. This dilemma is
widely  thought  to  generalize  beyond  piety  and  gods’ love  to  normative  and
evaluative properties in general and the attitudes or stances of any subjects towards
instances of such properties. I’ll now argue that (NEJ) helps to make sense of our
36 In what follows, I’m not making interpretive claims about the dialogue Euthyphro, but only 
summarize what I take to be a widely shared conception of a metaethical problem which Euthyphro 
can be read as raising. For one representative textbook presentation of the problem, see Timmons 
(2002: 29–30). 
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judgments about Euthyphro-style  cases,  and that insofar as these judgments are
plausible, (NEJ) supports them. Interpreting reasonable reconstructions of typical
kinds of reasoning in Euthyphro-style cases as relying on (NEJ) may not be the
only way of making sense of and supporting our judgments, but I hope to show it is
one good way of doing so.  
For concreteness of illustration, suppose that the following are necessary
truths: any act is right if and only if it maximizes general pleasure (GP, for short);
any act is right if and only if it is commanded by God; and God commands all and
only  what  maximizes  GP.  These  necessary  biconditionals  take  no  stand on the
direction of normative explanation. The possibilities are that actions are right in
virtue of maximizing GP and that actions are right in virtue of being commanded
by God. These cannot both be correct.  (The structure here is different from the
example  of  the  Socratic  sort.)  Overdetermination  aside,  one  putative  normative
explanation excludes the other (DePaul 1987). If ‘x is right because  x maximizes
GP’ is true, then ‘x is right because God commands x’ is false, and vice versa. 
Many of  us  (including some who believe  in  God)  believe  that  it  is  the
divine command explanation that is false. The typical reasoning is that we reject ‘x
is right because God commands  x’ because God’s commands would be arbitrary
unless they were based on independent reasons, such as perhaps that the action
maximizes GP. Does it make sense to reject ‘x is right because God commands x’
on the basis that God’s commands would be arbitrary unless they were based on
independent reasons? That would make sense if God’s commands wouldn’t in that
case normatively justify the responses that are appropriate to right action: doing it,
resenting those who don’t do it, or the like.37 And God’s commands wouldn’t do so
if they were arbitrary, since then they would lack the requisite normative authority.
37 That an action is commanded by God would of course be excellent evidence that it is right. But 
again, the relevant notion of justification isn’t that of the epistemic justification of a normative 
belief.
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But  if  so,  then ‘x is  right  because  God commands  x’ fails  (NEJ):  this  putative
explanation  doesn’t  identify  features  that  would  go  at  least  some way towards
justifying  the  relevant  responses.  So  (NEJ)  helps  to  make  sense  of  the  typical
Euthyphro-style reasoning for the falsity of ‘x is right because God commands x’.
Moreover, insofar as that conclusion is plausible, (NEJ) provides a way to support
it, by providing a connection between a putative normative explanation being false
and its failing to specify features that would justify certain responses. 
The  above  isn’t  sufficient  to  establish  that  ‘x is  right  because  God
commands x’ in fact is false. It isn’t fully clear what completion of it which doesn’t
make God’s commands redundant, and thus would destroy the explanation, would
identify the relevant kinds of justifying features.38 But one sort of completion might
specify  certain  relevant  features  of  God,  such  as  that  God  is  immutably
omnibenevolent (Adams 1987). If one took such additional information to show
that ‘x is right because God commands x’ was a true partial explanation all along or
to turn it into a fuller true explanation, (NEJ) again would help to make sense of
such reasoning. For the crucial point would seem to be that commands  rooted in
God’s immutably omnibenevolent nature aren’t arbitrary, and so they are eligible to
justify the relevant responses to what God commands. This would be to say that the
modified divine command explanation meets (NEJ) after all. Moreover, insofar as
the claim that the modified divine command explanation isn’t false were plausible,
(NEJ) would again provide a way to support it, based on the connection it provides
between the truth conditions of normative explanations and features that  would
justify  certain relevant  responses.  This  is  an  advantage:  as  a  general  condition,
38 Following Salmon (1970), it is widely accepted that the inclusion of explanatorily redundant 
information destroys explanation. To illustrate, consider an explanation of why a piece of sugar 
dissolved in a sample of liquid which cites the relevant law connecting water and the dissolution of 
sugar plus the fact that the liquid is holy water (Ruben 2012: 172). The richer information that the 
liquid is holy water doesn’t explain why the sugar dissolved even though the weaker information 
which it includes does explain why the sugar dissolved.
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(NEJ)  should  work  under  a  wide  range  of  assumptions  about  which  particular
normative explanations are true and which false. 
My argument in this section has also a broader lesson. It illustrates how
normative justification is hyperintensional: the truth-value of a sentence concerning
what  justifies  what  may  not  be  preserved  by  the  substitution  of  necessary
equivalents. For instance, that God commands  x and that  x maximizes GP differ
with respect to justifying doing  x. In cases where necessary equivalents differ in
what they justify, (NEJ) implies that the truth-value of a normative explanation is
also sensitive to distinctions that are finer than necessarily equivalence: if ‘x is right
because  God  commands  x’  fails  to  meet  the  necessary  condition  on  correct
explanation  specified  by  (NEJ),  it  doesn’t  follow  that  ‘x is  right  because  x
maximizes  GP’  is  also  false.  Thus  (NEJ)  can  explain  why the  substitution  of
necessary  equivalents  might  change  the  truth-value  also  of  a  normative
explanation. But hyperintensionality is widely regarded as a mark of explanation:
when  ‘Q  because  R’ states  an  explanation,  substituting  ‘R’ with  a  necessarily
equivalent expression may fail to preserve truth-value.39 So (NEJ) can account for a
widely accepted feature of explanation in the normative case.40 In that case (NEJ) is
39 One example is that (holding the laws of nature fixed) ‘has temperature t’ is necessarily 
equivalent with ‘is composed of molecules with mean kinetic energy m’. Although ‘b has 
temperature t because b’s molecules have mean kinetic energy m’ looks like a true explanation, ‘b 
has temperature t because b has temperature t’ is no explanation at all. Nothing explains itself. 
Another example is that ‘This figure is triangular because it is a closed plane figure with three 
angles’ can be a true explanation whereas ‘This figure is triangular because it is a closed plane 
figure with three sides’ isn’t, although the predicates flanking the ‘because’ on the right are again 
necessarily equivalent.
40 Explanation may be hyperintensional in two ways. One option is that the truth of an explanation 
is sensitive to the mode of presentation under which a fact is introduced to the explanation (cf. 
Ruben 2012: ch. 5). Two necessarily equivalent sentences or propositions may represent the same 
non-representational state of affairs, thus differing only in how the state is conceptualized. Another 
option is that at least some non-representational states of affairs which figure in explanations are 
themselves individuated hyperintensionally, so that pairs of necessarily equivalent propositions may
represent distinct states of affairs (Schnieder 2011; Nolan 2014). This interpretation of the 
hyperintensionality of explanation says that the truth of an explanation is sensitive to which 
(necessarily equivalent but distinct) facts figure in it. I won’t need to decide between these options 
here. Even when explanation is sensitive to modes of presentation, it can still be objective in the 
sense that it relates worldly facts without sensitivity to the background knowledge or interests of an 
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capable  of  securing  a  significant  dimension  of  continuity  between  normative
explanation and explanations in  other  domains.  There will  thus be at  least  two
respects in which scientific, metaphysical, and normative explanation all merit a
shared label ‘explanation’: each answers why-questions by providing reasons (even
as why-questions may request different kinds of reasons in different contexts) and
each sort of explanation is hyperintensional.
6. Getting Too Objective?
I’ll now address an objection to (NEJ). The objection says that even if normative
explanation  is  an  objective  relation  in  the  sense  I  have  specified,  normative
justification is sensitive also to some epistemic or pragmatic factors, and so isn’t
objective  in  a  parallel  sense.  Then  whether  a  normative  explanation  identifies
features that would go at least some towards justifying those responses wouldn’t—
contrary to (NEJ)—be a condition on correct normative explanation. It would at
most bear on how good or bad (relative to a context or audience) an explanation is. 
It isn’t immediately obvious how to make this objection more precise with
respect to the relevant non-objective factors. For instance, the thought cannot be
that  normative  justification  is  sensitive  to  epistemic  factors  because  it  isn’t
appropriate  to  criticize  you  for  doing  something  you  couldn’t  be  reasonably
expected to have known to be wrong. The action is still wrong. Your ignorance at
best excuses your wrongdoing. For all that this says, a complete correct explanation
of why the action was wrong must still identify features that would go at least some
towards  justifying  not  doing  it,  resenting  those  who  do  it  (unless,  perhaps,
excused),  and so on.  A better  thought  might  be  that  features  which  justify  the
relevant responses must be ones that it would be appropriate to cite in a normative
audience or the explanation’s capacity to induce understanding in the audience. Nor does the 
correctness of such an explanation depend on whether anyone is interested in conceptualizing the 
world in those ways or even grasps them. It then seems that first-order normative theories won’t 
need to care too much about fact individuation when constructing their normative explanations.
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justification, but that what features these are depends on the conversational context.
Even here, however, it is unclear why we should collapse the question whether a
normative  justification  is  good or  bad,  relative  to  an  audience,  to  the  question
whether it is correct. (Read ‘correct’ as a placeholder for whatever we select as a
success  term for normative justifications.)  Since (NEJ) allows us  to  distinguish
derivative and non-derivative explanations and justifications, it can happily allow
that  what  features  it  is  appropriate  to  cite  as  justifications  in  different
conversational contexts may depend on epistemic or pragmatic factors.
I’ll leave it for those who want to press this kind of objection to make it
more  precise,  and  will  instead  respond  just  to  the  core  suspicion  that  the
truth/correctness  conditions  of  normative  explanation  and  justification  are
differentially sensitive to pragmatic and epistemic factors. We have already seen
important  respects  in  which  the  two  are  parallel.  Normative  explanation  and
normative justification both admit  of the distinction between a correct  X and a
good/bad X (for an audience). In section 2 we saw that the correctness of the kinds
of explanations of normative facts which first-order normative theories aim to give
isn’t  relative  to  anyone’s  interests  or  background  knowledge  or  to  whether  it
induces understanding in the audience. It is similarly unclear why the normative
justifications  generated by such theories  should depend for their  correctness  on
such  conditions.  If  act-consequentialism  is  the  true  moral  theory,  the
appropriateness of the responses it prescribes to acts that maximize the value of
outcomes  won’t  be  relative  to  anyone’s  interests  or  background  knowledge.  A
further way to defend (NEJ) against the objection is to draw out some implications
of the widely accepted view (discussed above) that explanation (and thus normative
explanation) is hyperintensional.
Consider the kind of metaphysical hierarchy we find in the Socratic sort’s
case, where some facts that might be thought to make her life good (and thereby
explain why it is good) hold in virtue of other facts that might be thought to make
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her life good. Call such a hierarchy M. Take a special case M´ where the facts in M
are (type or token) identical. For example, suppose that the fact that an experience
E is good is identical with the fact that E is an experience pleasure and this in turn
is identical with the fact that the subject of E is in brain state B. Now either the fact
that E is good is a reason to promote, commend, or cherish E if and only if the
features that make E good are, or not. Some philosophers advocate the latter view:
features that make E good can be reasons to promote E (etc.) without its being the
case that the fact that E is good is a reason to do so. But suppose we don’t. That is,
suppose:
(G) In  any  metaphysical  hierarchy  of  the  form  M´,  the  fact  that
something is good is a reason to promote it (etc.) if and only if the
features that make it good are reasons to promote it (etc.).41
In cases under (G), we have a choice in what to cite as a normative reason for a
given response. We might cite the fact that a thing is good, or we might cite a good-
making feature. If (G) were true, then plausibly the only choice here would be the
pragmatic choice of which fact or facts it would be conversationally appropriate to
cite  in  the  context.  But  then  normative  explanation  and  justification  would  be
differentially  sensitive to  pragmatic  factors:  the  fact  that  an act  is  good cannot
explain why it is good, but (G) would allow it to go at least some way towards
justifying the relevant responses. However, I see no compelling reason to accept
(G). 
One problem for (G) has already come up. In discussing Euthyphro cases,
we saw that hyperintensional distinctions seem to be able to make a justificatory
difference independently of pragmatic factors. There is no clear reason why this
41 I adapt (G) from a discussion by Zoë Johnson King. Parallels to (G) can be constructed for 
rightness and other normative properties. If facts or properties are individuated hyperintensionally, 
hierarchies of the form M´ look rare. 
29
should be confined to Euthyphro style cases. So even if the fact that E is good is
identical to the fact that it has a good-making feature F, substituting one for the
other in a normative justification may fail to preserve truth-value. But even if we
bracket this issue, (G) is unstable.42 To say that a feature F is good making is to say
that it at least partly explains why some object o is F is good. If the fact that o is
good can be identical with the fact that  o has a good-making feature F, we must
allow that normative explanation is hyperintensional. Otherwise we would fail to
secure  the  result  that  ‘x is  good  because  x is  F’ can  be  a  correct  normative
explanation although ‘x is good because x is good’ isn’t. But if ‘That x is F (partly)
explains why x is good’ is hyperintensional with respect to ‘F’, it is hard to see why
‘That x is F is a normative reason for S to φ’ should fail to be hyperintensional with
respect to ‘F’. For instance, such a failure would make it difficult to hold that if the
fact that x is F (non-derivatively) explains why x is good, then the fact that x is F is
a (non-derivative) reason to promote, cherish, or commend x. So there is significant
pressure on (G) to deny that normative explanation is hyperintensional—a costly
move. But if normative explanation and justification aren’t differentially sensitive
to epistemic and pragmatic factors in this special case, why they should be so in
general?  I  conclude  that  we  have  yet  to  see  compelling  reason  to  think  that
normative explanation and justification are differentially sensitive to epistemic and
pragmatic factors.
7. Conclusion
I  have  argued  that  normative  explanation  is  subject  to  a  kind  of  justification
condition  to  which  explanations  of  non-normative  facts  aren’t  subject,  but  this
42 Those who think that the fact that x is good is a derivative normative reason (cf. note 34) should 
think also that (G) is either false or ambiguous. (Parallel points can again be made about rightness, 
etc.) (G) will be ambiguous unless it distinguishes derivative and non-derivative reasons. But 
consistent disambiguation will render (G) false on this view. For it will be false that goodness is a 
reason if and only if the good-making features are, irrespective of whether the reasons on each side 
are derivative or non-derivative.
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doesn’t make normative explanation significantly discontinuous with explanations
in  other  domains.  The  case  isn’t  decisive,  based  as  it  is  primarily  on  certain
intuitive motivations for (NEJ) and its capacity to make sense of certain aspects of
our  normative practices.  But  given the relatively undeveloped state  of work on
normative  explanation,  a  positive  case  for  (NEJ)  should  constitute  a  valuable
contribution. 
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